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CRIMINAL LAW COMMENTS AND ABSTRACTS
nessee courts started with a case denying the de-
fense because the facts did not substantiate a claim
of entrapment and later cases have concluded that
the defense is not recognized in the state.
In Reigan v. People"5 the Colorado court adopted
a novel approach. Defendants, who were game
wardens, approached two boys and suggested the
boys trap beaver (which was unlawful) and sell the
skins to the defendants. When charged with con-
spiracy to violate the Fish and Game Laws the
defendants argued they were only testing the boys.
The court rejected this claim, decided the boys
had been entrapped, and affirmed the conviction
of the wardens. The court said: "We do not wish
to be understood as intimating that the services of
a detective cannot be legitimately employed in the
discovery of the perpetrators of a crime that has
been, or is being, committed, but we do say that
when, in their zeal, or under a mistaken sense of
duty, detectives suggest the commission of a crime,
and instigate others to take part in its commission
in order to arrest them while in the act, although
the purpose may be to capture old offenders,
their conduct is not only reprehensible, but crimi-
nlal...."6
Whether this is a sound approach is seriously
doubted. Such a result as reached in Reigan will
certainly make law enforcement officers more con-
scious of their duty to stay within limits when
pursuing suspects. The weakness of Reigan is that
it does not define those limits and in reality may
hamper law enforcement, since officers will be ex-
tremely hesitant in testing suspects because con-
duct on their part, however slight it may be, which
trangresses that indefinite line separating permis-
sible from prohibited police conduct can subject
the officer to criminal prosecution. When entrap-
ment is established, discharging the accused is
enough protection to society and to the defendant.
61120 Colo. 472, 210 P.2d 991 (1949).
66 Id. at 993, 994. The approach of the Colorado
court affirms a suggestion made by Mikell, The Doctrine
of Entrapment in the Federal Courts, 90 U. PA. L. REv.
245, 264 (1942).
CONCLuSiOy AND RECO M -DATiOS
The sheer fiction of Sorrells v. United States in
establishing legislative intent as the basis of en-
trapment should be rejected. If the courts hesitate
to go as far as founding the doctrine on due proc-
ess, the Sorrells and Sherman concurring Justices
view of entrapment as resting on considerations of
public policy should be adopted. The same factors
will be relevant whether the basis is due process or
public policy but the constitutional approach pro-
vides the stronger foundation.
The accused's conduct is relevant since society
recognizes law enforcement officials must be al-
lowed freer reign when pursuing the naturally wary
criminal. Yet a mere showing of past criminal
tendency should not preclude the defense. A sug-
gested approach is to balance against any showing
of criminal predisposition the fairness and decency
of the police methods employed. Regardless of how
black the defendant's past may be, this balance
must be struck.
The issue of entrapment is generally submitted
to the jury unless subject to ruling as a matter of
law. While it may not make any difference who
decides the issue-there being no evidence to infer
a judge would reach a different verdict than a jury
-there are certain factors which favor submitting
the issue to the judge. As a means of protecting
judicial processes, entrapment is similar to the
power of the judge to punish for contempt or to
exclude evidence illegally obtained. Entrapment is
analogous to deciding questions of jurisdiction for
in each instance the judge must determine whether
the doors of the court are to be open. On these
grounds the question of entrapment should be for
the judge. A final argument for submitting entrap-
ment to the judge is that he is better able to weigh
the methods employed by law enforcement officials
in light of the defendant's past conduct. His judi-
cial training equips him to make such decisions of
degree. It is also assumed that a judge is less likely
than a jury to be emotionally swayed when a de-
fendant with a shameful past stands trial.
THE EXCLUSION OF ILLEGAL STATE EVIDENCE IN FEDERAL COURTS
GERALD H. GALLER
In 1914 the United States Supreme Court in the
leading case of Weeks v. United States,' adopted
what is commonly called the "federal exclusionary
rule." This rule excludes from the federal courts
1 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
any evidence seized by federal officers in violation
of the fourth amendment.2 The basis for the rule
2 "The right of people to be secure in their homes,
houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable search
and seizure, shall not be violated, and no warrant shall
issue, but upon probable cause supported by oath and
19591
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is that the fourth amendment's prohibition against
unreasonable searches and seizures would be of no
value if the federal courts sanction a violation of
it by allowing such evidence to be used in the
courts.
The Court specifically based its exclusionary
rule upon the fourth amendment and stated that
the rule has no application to state officers, "as
the fourth amendment is not directed to individual
misconduct of such officers. Its limitations reach
the federal government and its agencies."' Conse-
quently, the federal courts would allow the intro-
duction in federal cases of evidence illegally seized
by state officers. 4
The evil engendered by the Weeks exception in
favor of state officers was that federal officers,
wishing to overcome the burden of obtaining a
valid search warrant, could enlist the aid of a state
officer whose illegally seized evidence would then
be admissible in the proceeding in which the federal
officer was interested. In order to combat this prac-
tice the federal judiciary evolved what has been
called the "participation doctrine." The doctrine
was first enunciated in Byars v. United States.i
Here the Court held that unlawfully obtained evi-
dence would be inadmissible if obtained by state
officers "when the federal government itself,
through agents acting as such, participates in the
wrongful search and seizure." (Emphasis added.)
The Court excluded the evidence in question upon
a finding of overt participation of federal officers
in the search. Only upon this basis would the Court
exclude the evidence because, in accord with the
Weeks doctrine, there was no federal constitutional
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized". U.S.
CONST. amend. IV, §1.
Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914).
"Generally speaking, in the federal courts, state
officers are considered as strangers as far as the use of
evidence procured by search and seizure is considered;
and although search and seizure by state officers may
be illegal if made entirely independent of any federal
officer, the evidence seized is usually admissible in
prosecutions in the federal courts." United States v.
Haywood, 208 F.2d 156,158 (7th Cir. 1953).
For criticism of Weeks, see People v. Defore, 242
N.Y. 13, 150 N.E. 585, cert. denied 270 U.S. 657 (1926);
8 WiGMORE, EVIDENCE §2184 (3d ed. 1940); Harno,
Evidence Obtained by Illegal Search and Seizure, 19 ILL.
L. REv. 303 (1925); For approval of Weeks, see
Anderson, Admissibility of Illegally Obtained Evidence,
8 U. DET L.J. 97 (1945): Atkinson, Admissibility of
Evidence Obtained Through Unreasonable Search and
Seizure, 25 COLUM. L. REv. 11 (1925).
% 273 U.S. 28 (1927).
objection to a state officer's illegal search and
seizure.6
For thirty-five years following the Weeks case no
question was raised as to the possible application
of the fourth amendment to the states and their
police officers. Then in 1949 the Supreme Court in
Wolf v. ColoradoJ held that unreasonable searches
and seizures by state officers are prohibited by
reason of the fourteenth amendment's due process
clause, which was considered to embody a protec-
tion against such police activities. It was further
held, however, that although the invasion by state
officers was unconstitutional, state court admissi-
bility of evidence unlawfully obtained is not a
denial of due process, because the exclusionary rule
is a judicially created rule of evidence and not a
constitutional bar extending to state courts.
In the course of its reasoning, the Court declared
its reluctance to interfere with the internal affairs
of the states in the absence of an express provision
in the constitution authorizing it to act. Finding
no express provision requiring the states to adopt
6 To clarify its position on the subject and because
of the obvious difficulty in applying the participation
doctrine, the Court in the same year broadened the
test to be applied in Gambino v. United States, 275
U.S. 310 (1927). Here, state officers acting alone and
under no known prior agreement with federal officers
illegally seized evidence which, while it could prove a
federal offense, was not relevant to any state crime. A
unanimous decision held the evidence to be inadmiss
able on the ground that even though there was no
participation by federal officers, the state police acted
solely on behalf of the United States. At first blush, the
case would seem to remedy the fault of the present law
by discouraging state and federal officers from taking
advantage of the former's "immunity" in the federal
courts. The evidence would be suppressed if a "federal
intention" could be found. However, this "intention"
has been found to exist only where there was no state
crime involved. In the majority of cases where state
and federal crimes overlap, the Gambino test is of no
significance. See Burford v. United States, 214 F.2d
124 (5th Cir. 1954); Symons v. United States, 178 F.
2d 615 (9th Cir. 1949); Miller v. United States, 50 F.
2d 505 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied 284 U.S. 651 (1931);
Sloan v. United States, 47 F.2d 889 (10th Cir. 1930).
The "participation" doctrine has been recently re-
stated in Lustig v. United States, 338 U.S. 74 (1949).
"The crux of that doctrine is that a search is a search
by a federal officer if he had a hand in it; it is not a
search by a federal officer if evidence secured by state
authorities is turned over to the federal authority on a
silver platter. The decisive factor in determining the
applicability of the Byars case is the actuality of a
share by a federal officer in the total enterprise of secur-
ing and selecting by other than sanctioned means. It is
immaterial whether a federal agent originated the idea
or joined in it while the search was in progress. So long
as he was in it before the object of the search was com-
pletely accomplished, he must be deemed to have par-
ticipated in it."
7 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
[Vol. 49
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the exclusionary rule, the Court held that the im-
position of such a prohibition upon the states
would be an undue interference.8
Apparently the Court was impressed by the fact
that only a minority of the states were then fol-
lowing the exclusionary rule in their own courts.9
In support of its position, the Court stressed the
fact that the states which have rejected the ex-
clusionary rule rely upon other remedies.' 0 In re-
spect to the efficacy of these remedies, the majority
refused to condemn them as falling below the min-
imal standards of due process.
Although the Wolf case has sharply limited the
federal exclusionary rule by not applying it to the
states, it left open an important question. Now
that state officers are bound by the command of
the fourth amendment, should evidence unconsti-
tutionally seized by them continue to be welcome
in the federal courts?
In ruling that the fourth amendment operates
through the fourteenth to make unreasonable state
searches unconstitutional, the Court in Wolf over-
ruled the very constitutional holding which was
the basis for the Weeks exception in favor of ad-
mitting illegally seized state evidence in a federal
court. Now that the basis for distinction between
state and federal officers has been eliminated, it is
no longer consonant with reason and justice to
apply the exclusionary rule differently in the fed-
s Until the Wolf case the federal exclusion rule was
treated in the federal courts as being an integral part
of the fourth amendment and not a rule of evidence
enacted to enforce it. Now that the Wolf case has de-
clared that the fourth amendment applies to the states
through the fourteenth amendment, an obvious incon-
sistency was manifested when the Court refused to
allow the exclusionary rule to be included in the four-
'teenth amendment. This confusion was recognized by
Justice Black in his concurring opinion in the Wolf case.
He stated that he would concur in the result on the
ground that the exclusionary rule was a rule of evi-
dence since it would be anomalous to have this result
while deeming the rule to be part of the Constitution.
The practical effect of the case, then, is virtually to
leave to state determination the matter of making
effective a federal guarantee of a basic constitutional
right.
Only seventeen states were following the federal
exclusionary rule at this time according to the appendix
of Justice Frankfurter's opinion in the Wolf case.
10 It was argued that there is a common law action
for damages against a policeman who acts unlawfully
and that most states have criminal sanctions against
such conduct. See Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25,30(1949). A dissenting opinion points out, however, that
a plaintiff would be likely to recover only nominal
damages in a tort action and that it was rather naive
to assume that a district attorney or policeman would
be prosecuted "for well-meaning violations of the search
and seizure clause during a raid the District Attorney or
his associates have ordered." Id. at 42.
eral courts according to the governmental affili-
ation of the searching party.
The Supreme Court was immediately aware of
the possible consequences of the Wolf case on the
Weeks decision" but has not entertained a case
since then where the question had to be decided.
Consequently, the lower federal courts have all
adhered to the original rule as laid down in Weeks.'2
Recently, however, the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia, in the case
of lanna v. United States, '3 came to grips with the
problem. The court reversed a decision based upon
evidence illegally seized by state officers, holding
that such evidence should be inadmissible in a
federal court. The basis for this revolutionary de-
cision was that the Wolf case had overruled part of
Weeks and the court was therefore free to apply the
federal exclusionary rule to all illegal evidence
sought to be used in a federal court. 4 Meanwhile,
in the remaining circuits, the WTeeks rule continues
to be applied with its original potency.
The result of allowing such evidence in the
federal courts has been the cause of many evils.
The obvious one is demonstrated where federal
and state crimes overlap. In these situations state
and federal officers necessarily co-operate to a large
extent in crime prevention and law enforcement.'-
" In Lustig v. United States, 338 U.S. 74 (1949),
decided immediately after the Wolf case, the Court
found federal participation in an illegal seizure and
excluded the evidence on that ground. Mr. Justice
Frankfurter, however, stated that "where there is par-
ticipation on the part of federal officers it is not neces-
sary to consider what would be the result if the search
had been conducted entirely by State officers." Id. 79.
12 E.g. Gallegos v. United States, 237 F.2d 694
(10th Cir. 1956); United States v. Moses, 234 F.2d
124 (7th Cir. 1956); Serio v. United States, 203 F.2d
576 (5th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 887. Cf.
Jones v. United States, 217 F.2d 381 (8th Cir. 1954),
(where the court said that while the exclusionary rule.
in the federal courts is now subject to doubt since the
Wolf case, they would continue to apply Weeks until
the Supreme Court "expressly changes it".
'3.._F.2d.(D.C. Cir. 1958).
14 The court looked at the entire picture of search and
seizure and concluded that, "on principle and as a
matter of sound policy in the administration of judicial
proceedings in the District of Columbia we think all
evidence obtained by violation of the Constitution
should be excluded". The case was handed down as this
Comment was about to be published.
15 E.g., Allen, The Wolf Case: Search aid Seizure,
Federalism and the Civil Liberties, 45 ILL. L. R-v. 1,23;
statement of Thomas E. Dewey. in N.Y. CoNsTTVU-
nONAL COwvENTrio>, Revised Record 372 (1938), "In
dozens of cases in my own experience as a federal
prosecutor we had to rely upon the evidence procurred
by the unhampered police of the State of New York or
important criminals would have gone free".
1959]
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If overt participation between the two is estab-
lished, the evidence will be excluded in federal
courts under the participation doctrine;16 but the
extreme difficulty of proving joint participation in
an unlawful seizure tends to encourage the prac-
tice, thereby allowing federal agents to circumvent
federal policy with the help of state officers. It is,
therefore, far from realistic to treat state police as
private citizens in. applying the exclusionary rule
in the federal courts.'-
Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Pro-
cedure18 provides generally for the admissibility of
evidence in the federal courts. The philosophy be-
hind this rule is that there shall be a "uniform
body of rules of evidence to govern in criminal
trials in the federal courts."' 9 The present pro-
cedure in most of the federal courts in this field of
search and seizure, however, does not promote a
uniform application of this rule in all cases. As has
been pointed out already, while evidence tainted
by federal participation in an illegal seizure will
be rejected, the same evidence when submitted by
state officers as the result of state raid will be ad-
mitted.
The defect in the present system is particularly
offensive when the officer involved is an oficer of a
state which has adopted tie exclusimary ride.2
When, under such circumstances, unlawfully seized
evidence is turned over to a federal prosecutor,
" Lustig v. United States, 338 U.S. 74 (1949),
Byars v. United States, 273 U.S. 28 (1927).
17 The illogical result was eloquently illustrated by
Justice Cardozo in People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 16,
150 N.E. 585, 588, cert. denied, 270 U.S. 657 (1926).
"How finely the line is drawn is seen when we recall
that marshals in the service of the nation are on one
side of it, and the police in the service of the states are
on the other. The nation may keep what the servants
of the states supply. ... The professed object of the
trespass rather than the official character of the tres-
passer should test the rights of the government....
We exhalt form over substance when we hold that the
use is made lawful because the intruder was without a
badge of office."
11 "The admissibility of evidence-shall be governed,
except where an Act of Congress or these rules other-
wise provide, by the principals of the common law as
they may be interpreted by the courts of the United
States in the light of reason and experience."
1' Notes of Advisory Committee on Rules, FED. R.
(RIM. P. 26.
-.o The following states follow the federal exclusionary
rule: California. Delaware, Florida, Idaho, Illinois,
Indiana, Kentucky, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri,
Montana, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Oregon, South
Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Washington, West Virginia,
Wisconsin and Wyoming. Also Alaska and District of
Columbia. Alabama and Maryland have adopted a
modified version of it. The cases are collected in 50
A.L.R.2d 531 (1956).
both officials frustrate the spirit of the state and
federal policy of exclusion. It has been declared by
the ever increasing number of courts following the
exclusionary rule that the rule is the most effective
means of discouraging unlawful police action.2 1
Therefore, allowing officers of these states to cir-
cumvent the state evidential rule of exclusion when
state and federal crimes overlap is to pervert the
purpose behind the adoption of the rule itself. The
admission by federal courts of illegally seized evi-
dence presented by state officers serves as a prac-
tical encouragement to these officers to continue
their unlawful practices, and thus constitutes a
hindrance to efforts to raise and maintain high
standards in law enforcement activities-especially
in those states that have adopted the exclusionary
rule.
The case of Rea v. Unzited States22 should be
considered here. In this case the Supreme Court,
by a 5-4 decision, held that a federal officer could
be enjoined from introducing illegally acquired
evidence in a state court. The Court did not discuss
any possible constitutional implications of the con-
duct involved, but based its decision solely on the
theory that federal agents should not be permitted
to flout federal policy by going into a state court.
In this respect, the Court pointed to its "super-
visory powers over federal law enforcement agen-
des." The "federal policy" presumably is to keep
federal agents and courts "clean" of illegally seized
evidence. Allowing state illegally seized evidence in
the federal courts is as contrary to federal policy
as allowing a federal officer to enter a state court
with the same kind of evidence." The federal courts
also have at least as much "supervisory power"
over their own rules of evidence as they do over
21 California recently adopted the federal rule of
exclusion. The court states that a system that permits
the prosecution to trust habitually the use of illegally
obtained evidence cannot help but encourage violations
of the Constitution at the expense of the lawful means
of enforcing the law. It was also stressed that if courts
respect the constitutional provisions by refusing to
sanction their violations, they will not only command the
respect of the law-abiding citizens, but they will arouse
public opinion as a deterrent to lawless enforcement of
the laws by bringing just criticism to bear on law en-
forcement officers who allow criminals to escape by
pursuing them in lawless ways. People v. Cahan, 44
Cal.2d 434, 282 P.2d 905 (1955).
350 U.S. 214 (1956). Federal agents arrested Rea
on a federal narcotics charge. The narcotics were
illegally seized and were suppressed in the federal
court. Undaunted by this turn of events, the federal
agents swore out a warrant charging possession of
narcotics in violation of a state law. Rea went into a
federal district court to seek an injunction which would
prevent the federal agents from testifying.
[Vol. 49
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federal officers. In the light of the philosophy ex-
pressed in Rea, it is questionable whether the con-
tinued admission into the federal courts of such
evidence is consistent with federal policy as ex-
emplified by the exclusionary rule.Y Moreover, a
recent case has held that the defense of entrapment
will be sustained in the federal courts even though
the officer entrapping the defendant was a state
officer. 2'
There remains the question as to whether the
rejection of such evidence would unduly disturb
the delicate federal-state relationship. In the three
main cases in this area, Weeks, Wolf, and Rea, this
conflict of rights has been a major determining
factor in the Courts' decisions.22
2 Few states have ruled on the admissibilitv of
evidence of officers from other jurisdictions. Those
states which normally admit such evidence from their
own officers have welcomed federally seized evidence.
E.g. People v. Harmon. 89 Cal. App.2d 55, 200 P.2d
32 (1948); Terrano v. State, 59 Nev. 247, 91 P.2d 67
(1939); Commonwealth v. Colpo, 98 Pa. Super. 460,
cert. denied, 282 U.S. 863 (1930).
Some of the states following the exclusionary rule will
also admit such evidence holding that the state ex-
clusionary rule binds only their own officers. E.g.,
State ex rel. Kuhr v. District Court, 82 Mont. 515, 268
Pac. 501 (1928), (noting that the federal courts allow
evidence illegally obtained by state officers, so by the
same reasoning, a state should not question federally
obtained evidence); Johnson v. State, 155 Tenn. 628,
299 S.W. 800 (1927) (dictum). Cf. People v. Touhy.
361 Ill. 332, 197 N.E. 849 (1935) (holding that illegally
seized evidence of officers of another state admissible).
Other adherents to the exclusionary rule, however,
exclude the evidence regardless of the governmental
affiliation of the searching party. E.g., Little v. State,
171 Miss. 818, 159 So. 103 (1935); State v. Arregui, 44
Idaho 43, 254 Pac. 788 (1927); State v. Rebasti, 306 Mo.
336, 347, 267 S.W. 858, 861 (1924), "It is unthinkable
that a State court is powerless to protect the con-
stitutional rights of its citizens, guaranteed by the
Federal Constitution. To hold the evidence of the
Federal agents admissible in this case is to pronounce
that doctrine. It is to say that an act of an officer is
lawful or unlawful, not on account of the character of
the act, but on account of the court in which it is called
in question."
No state has ever attempted to preclude one of its
officers from going into a federal court with his illegally
seized evidence. This possibility was discussed by one
writer who concluded that a state attempting to enjoin
its officers would run afoul of the supremacy clause
of the Constitution. Parsons, Stale-Federal Crossfire,
42 CORNELL L. Q. 346, 363 (1957).
24 Henderson v. United States, 237 F.2d 169 (5th
Cir. 1956).
-5The matter was put in classic terms by Chief
Justice Taney in Abelmen v. Booth, 62 U.S. (21 How.)
506, 516 (1858). "The powers of the general govern-
ment and of the state, although both exist and are
exercised within the same territorial limits, are yet
separate and distinct sovereignties, acting separately
and independently of each other, within their respec-
tive spheres."
In determining whether there is any federal-
state conflict involved if the federal courts reject
state-procured illegal evidence, it is pertinent to
compare and analyze the situation with the law
regarding wiretapping. Although wiretapping has
been held not to be included within the prohibition
of the fourth amendment, the policy consider-
ations and federal-state relationship in this field
are the same.
Section 605 of the Federal Communications
Act, "7 as construed by the Supreme Court, prohib-
its the interceptions of conversations over elec-
tronic communication media. The leading case
applying this act is Nardone v. United States,- in
which the Supreme Court rejected wiretap evidence
procured by federal agents. This case may be
likened to the Veeks case in that the act was con-
strued to apply to federal officers when their evi-
dence was introduced in a federal court proceeding.
In Schwartz v. Texas,2 however, illegally seized
wiretap evidence of state agents was held to be
admissible in a state court. The basis of this ruling
was substantially the same as that of the W Folf
case, i.e., the court's reluctance to interfere with
the state court procedure even though it was
pointed out that the act applied to state officers
and made their wiretaps illegal. 3U But the ostensi-
ble gap between the effect of the Nardone and
Schwartz cases was partially closed in Benanti v'.
United States,"' a unanimous Supreme Court de-
cision holding that wiretap evidence obtained by
state officers was inadmissible in a federal prose-
cution. The Schwartz case was distinguished by the
Court on the ground that the case involved a state
proceeding and "that despite the plain prohibition
2G Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
27 ,... No person not being authorized by the
sender shall intercept any communication and devulge
or publish the existence, contents, substance, purport,
effect, or meaning of any intercepted communication to
any person...". 18 STAT. 1103 (1934), 47 U.S.C.
§605 (1953).
28302 U.S. 379 (1937). This revolutionary decision
was soon followed by a holding which greatly increased
the scope of the Act. In the second Nardone case not
are communications themselves excluded, but also the
only information gained by the government as a result
of the wiretap. Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338
(1939).
29 344 U.S. 199 (1952).
-1 This case illustrates the unwillingness of the
Supreme Court of the United States to interpret any
act of Congress or Constitutional provision to be
binding upon the states unless it expressly is provided
for. The Act in question was held to apply to the states,
and the Act expressly prohibited the use of such
evidence; yet, the Court would still not interfere.
31355 U.S. 96 (1957).
